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Who inhabits the European public sphere? Winners and losers,
supporters and opponents in Europeanised political debates
RUUD KOOPMANS
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Abstract. European integration shifts the distribution of political opportunities to influence
public debates, improving the relative influence of some collective actors, and weakening
that of others.This article investigates which actors profit from and which actors stand to lose
from the Europeanisation of political communication in mass-mediated public spheres.
Furthermore, it asks to what extent these effects of Europeanisation can help one to under-
stand collective actors’ evaluation of European institutions and the integration process. Data
is analysed on some 20,000 political claims by a variety of collective actors, drawn from 28
newspapers in seven European countries in the period 1990–2002, across seven different
issue fields with varying degrees of EU policy-making power. The results show that govern-
ment and executive actors are by far the most important beneficiaries of the Europeanisa-
tion of public debates compared to legislative and party actors, and even more so compared
to civil society actors, who are extremely weakly represented in Europeanised public
debates. The stronger is the type of Europeanisation that is considered, the stronger are
these biases. For most actors, a close correspondence is found between how Europeanisation
affects their influence in the public debate, on the one hand, and their public support for, or
opposition to, European institutions and the integration process, on the other.
Introduction
Policy decisions in Europe are increasingly taken in the supranational and
intergovernmental arenas, but the nation-state has remained the primary focus
for collective identities and citizen participation. This discrepancy between
Europe’s institutional development, on the one hand, and the continuing
predominance of the national political space as the arena for public debates
and participatory citizenship, on the other, is at the core of Europe’s ‘demo-
cratic deficit’. Since the early 1990s, the former ‘permissive consensus’ on
European integration has eroded. Trust in European institutions and support
for the integration process have steadily declined, and so has voter participa-
tion in European elections in many countries (Schmitt & Thomassen 1999).
The 2004 European parliamentary elections showed a record low turnout and
a shift towards Eurosceptic parties. The failed ratifications of the European
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constitutional project in the French and Dutch referenda of 2005 are further
indications that citizen support for the European integration process is no
longer self-evident.
More even than on the national level, the communication flow between the
European Union (EU) and other European-level institutions and the public
depends on the mass media. The media fulfil four crucial functions in the
European policy process. First, in the absence of direct communicative links,
European actors, issues and policies have to be made visible by the media, and
it is in this public forum that they must gain public legitimacy (legitimation
function). Second, with the partial exception of opinion polling – which pro-
vides only punctual, pre-structured and non-discursive access to the public
opinion – European policy makers depend on the mass media for information
about the concerns of the citizenry (responsiveness function). Third and con-
versely, the public can build its opinion about European institutions and the
complexities of multilevel policies only to a small extent on direct personal
experience and must therefore rely on how Europe becomes visible in the
mass media (accountability function). Finally, participation of citizens in the
European policy process usually requires access to the mass media. Although
a small number of resourceful and well-organised actors have direct access to
European policy makers (e.g., in the context of the Brussels lobbying circuit),
most forms of citizens’ participation through nongovernmental organisations
(NGOs), civic initiatives and social movements can influence policy makers
only if they are able to achieve visibility in the mass media (participation
function).
The conditions for a European public sphere that can fulfil these functions
have come to the foreground of the social-scientific debate about European
integration (among many others, see Eder et al. 1998; Neidhardt et al. 2000;
Eriksen & Fossum 2000; Semetko et al. 2000; De Beus & Mak 2001; Risse 2002;
Kevin 2003; Trenz 2004). This discussion has long remained normative and
speculative.This article, and the wider project of which it is part, contributes to
a more empirically grounded view on the Europeanisation of public spheres.
We do not focus on public opinion as measured in surveys (i.e., on the indi-
vidual level of the opinions and perceptions of European citizens), but on the
degree of Europeanisation of public debates and collective political mobilisa-
tion as they become visible in the European print media (i.e., publicised
opinion). Our first question is how European integration has affected the
opportunities of different collective actors to intervene in public debates and
achieve public visibility. From the point of view of the democratic deficit, we
will be especially interested in contrasting the accessibility of Europeanised
political debates across three categories of actors: government and executive
actors, legislative and party actors, and civil society actors.
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Subsequently, we turn to our second research question – namely to what
extent there is a correspondence between actors’ access to Europeanised
policy debates, and their evaluation of European institutions and of the Euro-
pean integration process. We argue that the impact of Europeanisation on
actors’ discursive influence adds to our understanding of the divergent support
for European integration and for European institutions across various
collective actors. We hypothesise that actors who have limited access to
Europeanised public debates will also be critical of European integration and
institutions, whereas the actors whose voices are most prominent in debates on
European issues will be more favourably inclined towards European integra-
tion and institutions. We empirically address these questions with content-
analytic data on public claims-making in seven issue fields (monetary politics,
agriculture, immigration, military troop deployment, pensions, education and
the meta-issue of European integration) in the print media of seven European
countries (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, the Nether-
lands and Switzerland) in the period 1990–2002
Theoretical framework
If one looks for a genuinely supranational public sphere on the European
level, there is not much to be found (see Schlesinger 1999). There have been a
few attempts to establish European-wide mass media, but most of these have
quickly disappeared (such as the daily newspaper The European) or lead a
marginal existence (e.g., the television station Euronews or the weekly Euro-
pean Voice, which both reach only small audiences). Transnational media that
have been able to carve out a niche in the media landscape have a global,
rather than European profile and audience (e.g., CNN, BBC World, Interna-
tional Herald Tribune, Le Monde diplomatique, Financial Times).
When focusing on the mass media public sphere, one therefore arrives
naturally at a ‘Europeanisation’ approach (e.g., Green Cowles et al. 2001; Hix
& Goetz 2000; Radaelli 2000; Ledrach 2001) that focuses on the domestic
impacts of European integration – in this case, the ways in which European
integration affects public debates in national news media (Gerhards 1993,
2000). Imig and Tarrow (2001) have similarly shown that social movement
mobilisation on European issues only rarely takes the form of full-fledged
European-wide campaigns and is more often of the ‘domesticated’ variant in
which national social movements make claims within the national public
sphere, but do so referring to European institutions, norms or legislation.
We assume that – not least because of the language factor – nationally-
based mass media are here to stay, but that their coverage may increasingly
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include European actors and issues. There are two basic forms in which this
may happen. First, actors and institutions from the European level (e.g., EU
commissioners or the European Parliament) may become more prominent as
speakers in public debates in national news media.We will refer to this form as
‘supranational Europeanisation’ of public debates. Second, claims made by
national actors in national media may increasingly refer to European institu-
tions, issues, legal frameworks, norms and identities. This we will call ‘vertical
Europeanisation’ of public debates. Several authors have argued that Euro-
peanisation of public debates can also occur without any direct reference to
European-level actors or policies (e.g., Risse 2002; Van der Steeg 2002; Koop-
mans & Erbe 2004). Many EU policies as well non-EU forms of European
integration (e.g., in the context of the Council of Europe or the Organisation
for Security and Cooperation in Europe) have an intergovernmental rather
than supranational basis.This may lead to increased media attention for actors
from one European country in the national news media of another country.We
refer to this as ‘horizontal Europeanisation’. In an intergovernmental polity,
other member states can no longer be treated as foreign countries whose
internal politics are not relevant for one’s own country. This tendency is rein-
forced by the interdependence created by common market policies and the
freedom of movement within the EU. For instance, if Germany liberalises its
naturalisation policies, this is immediately relevant for other EU Member
States because, once naturalised, immigrants from Germany can freely travel
to and take up work in another EU country.
We thus distinguish three forms of Europeanisation of public debates and
claims making:
Supranational Europeanisation: an increased role for actors and institu-
tions from the European level in public debates in national news media.
Vertical Europeanisation: when national actors address or refer to Euro-
pean institutions, issues, legal frameworks, norms and identities.
Horizontal Europeanisation: increased attention for actors and institu-
tions from other European countries in national news media.
None of these three forms implies anything a priori about the qualitative
nature of Europeanised public communication. In other words, we do not
assume that Europeanisation of public communication entails increasing con-
sensus or convergence across countries (see similarly Radaelli 2000; Ledrach
2001; Vink 2002). Our notion of Europeanisation also extends beyond a more
narrow conception of ‘EU-isation’, which would include only references to EU
institutions, policies and Member States (similarly Vink 2002). In line with this
wider conception of ‘Europeanisation’, our analysis includes news media from
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a non-EU member state (Switzerland) next to six EU members. Moreover, our
operationalisations of supranational, vertical and horizontal Europeanisation
include claims by and references to European-level institutions and conven-
tions outside the framework of the EU, as well as claims by actors from
European countries outside the EU.
In earlier papers from our project, we have investigated these three types of
Europeanisation from a quantitative perspective, focusing on the shares of
Europeanised claims compared to purely national claims-making, and on the
question to what extent there is a trend of increased Europeanised claims-
making over the period 1990–2002 (e.g., Koopmans & Erbe 2004; Koopmans &
Pfetsch 2003). These analyses reveal that the share of Europeanised claims
diverges strongly across issue fields. In issue fields where European competen-
cies are strong (e.g., monetary and agricultural politics), public debates are
strongly Europeanised: European-level actors and actors from other Euro-
pean countries appear frequently as speakers or as addressees of claims, and
issues are frequently discussed in a European frame of reference. In the other
four issue fields that we studied (immigration, troop deployment, pensions and
retirement, and education) Europeanisation tendencies were much less strong.
This is less a result of a lack of media interest in European issues than of the
fact that most decision-making competencies in these fields have thus far
remained on the national level. These results indicate that if there is a public
sphere aspect to the European democratic deficit, it is not primarily of a
quantitative nature (i.e., the problem is not that European actors and issues
are not sufficiently reported in the media). However, this leaves open the
possibility that there may be qualitative aspects of Europeanised political
communication that contribute to the democratic deficit.
We therefore now address the important question of how the Europeani-
sation of public debates affects the opportunities for public claims-making
of different categories of actors. In doing so, we follow the lead of theories of
social movements and collective action, which have emphasised the role of
so-called ‘political opportunity structures’ for explaining patterns of political
mobilisation (e.g., Tarrow 1994; Kriesi et al. 1995).1 Hix and Goetz (2000:12)
have related this theoretical tradition to the study of Europeanisation: ‘[A]
new institutional arena at the European level impacts on domestic political
systems by providing a new “structure of opportunities” for domestic actors.’
The transfer of competencies from the national to the intergovernmental and
supranational European arenas opens up opportunities and makes resources
available for some actors, but not – or not to the same extent – for others.
Similarly, the erosion of undivided national sovereignty may improve the
opportunities of some actors, but may also negatively affect those of actors
who obtained institutionalised access to national resources and opportunity
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structures. European integration unavoidably implies a redistribution of
power, not just institutionally, but also regarding public debates and political
mobilisation (see also, e.g., Moravcsik 1994; Marks & McAdam 1999; Rucht
2000).
Next to shifting political opportunity structures, a second factor that may
influence the chances of actors to intervene in Europeanised public debates
are differences in the news selection process between national coverage and
international or European news coverage. National news reporting is subject
to less strict selection pressures than international or supranational coverage.
In non-domestic news coverage, international press agencies play a more
important role, and among foreign correspondents there is a stronger tendency
to rely on institutional sources and news routines (e.g., Schulz 1997; Meyer
1999).This implies greater difficulties for less resourceful actors to get access to
European and foreign news coverage, and a greater reliance in such news on
institutional actors, especially executive and governmental actors such as the
European Commission, or national foreign ministers and heads of state.
While there is consensus that European integration affects the relative
opportunities for different actors, it is much less clear in which direction such
changes go. On the one hand, the weakness of democratic access on the
European level and the bureaucratic and arcane nature of the European
decision-making process may lead one to expect a European public sphere
that is inhabited primarily by bureaucrats, statesman and perhaps a few
other resourceful actors. The EU and other European-level institutions are,
however, also often seen as counterweights against entrenched national
powers, which offer opportunities for a variety of interest groups, NGOs, social
movements and other civil society actors (see, e.g., Soysal 1994; Eder et al.
1998; Wiener 1998). Hix and Goetz (2000: 14) discuss various reasons why
European integration may benefit either resourceful elite actors, or actors that
are relatively weak in the domestic arena, but ultimately arrive at the optimis-
tic conclusion that ‘the openness of the EU policy process and the pursuit of
neo-pluralist strategies by the Commission (such as subsidising under-
represented groups) ensure that both diffuse and concentrated interests tend
to be able to pursue exit and veto opportunities and have access to key
information’.
In this article, we investigate the empirical merits of these different views
on the consequences of Europeanisation. We address the question of the
composition of Europeanised public debates from two angles. First, we ask
who participates in Europeanised public debates of the three types (suprana-
tional, vertical and horizontal) and compare this to debates that remain fully
within a national frame of reference. By analysing which actors are overrep-
resented and which are underrepresented in Europeanised claims-making, we
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get an indication of who benefits most from the Europeanisation of public
debates. Second, we turn to actors’ subjective evaluations and ask what posi-
tions with regard to European institutions and the European integration
process different actors take in the public debate.This will give us an indication
of the extent to which actors consider European institutions as their allies and
see the European integration process as congruent with their interests. We
hypothesise that these subjective and objective dimensions are related to each
other, and that there is a correspondence between the degree to which actors
gain access to Europeanised public debates and their subjective evaluation of
European integration. This hypothesis, too, can be derived from the literature
on political opportunity structures, which has shown that closed political insti-
tutions tend to provoke confrontational challenges, whereas open opportunity
structures invite more consensual and cooperative strategies from collective
actors (e.g., Kriesi et al. 1995: 44–51)
Data and methodology
For the data collection we use the methodology of political claim analysis
(Koopmans & Statham 1999), which takes individual instances of claims-
making by public actors as the unit of analysis. This approach differs from
traditional media content analysis, which usually takes newspaper articles as
the unit of analysis and uses article-level variables to investigate how journal-
ists frame the news. Traditional methods can tell us with which frequency
certain actors and issues are mentioned, and to what extent they co-occur in
news stories, but they tell us nothing about the relations between actors, their
role in public debates or the positions they take with regard to which issues. It
is precisely such information about who addresses who on which issues and
referring to which spatial and political contexts that we need in order to
answer questions about the Europeanisation of public spheres and the differ-
ent forms it may take.
An instance of claims-making (shorthand: ‘a claim’) is a unit of strategic
action in the public sphere that we define as: the purposive and public articu-
lation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms or physical
attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the
claimants and/or other collective actors. Of each claim, we code the actor or
actors who make it, the addressees at which it is (critically, affirmatively or
neutrally) directed, the issues that are addressed and the ways in which these
issues are framed referring to specific legal, normative, institutional and spatial
contexts.We thus have information about those aspects of claims that we need
in order to answer our research questions: whether the actor behind a claim
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(the claimant) was from the same country as the newspaper that reports the
claim, or whether it was from another European country or from the European
supranational or intergovernmental levels; whether the claim referred only
to national legal, normative, institutional and spatial contexts, or whether
it included references to other European countries or to the supranational
or intergovernmental European levels; and finally, whether the claimant
expressed support, opposition or a neutral attitude towards European institu-
tions and the European integration process.
Claims are included in our data regardless of who makes them and where
they are made; our data include claims by state actors, economic actors, jour-
nalists and news media,2 as well as representatives of civil society. Claims can
be made by organisations and their spokespersons as well as by diffuse collec-
tives (e.g., a group of farmers). The actors who make claims may be from the
European, national, regional and local levels, and they can be from the country
where the newspaper is published as well as from another European country.3
As already stated above, we do not limit Europeanisation to ‘EU-isation’ and
therefore use an inclusive definition of Europe that includes not just the 25 EU
Member States plus all applicants including Turkey, but also other European
countries such as Norway, Switzerland and the Balkan States. We also include
claims by non-EU supranational and intergovernmental institutions on the
European level, such as the Council of Europe or the European Free Trade
Association.4 Comparative analyses across our seven countries provide
support for this inclusive view because the degree of Europeanisation of public
debates in Swiss newspapers turns out to exceed that in the United Kingdom
(Koopmans 2004a). This shows that attention for European institutions and
policies, and for actors and issues in other European countries, is not neces-
sarily tied to EU membership.
Against the use of media as a source, one may argue that many attempts at
claims-making fail to pass the media’s selection filters. For our research ques-
tion, however, it is the publicly visible claims that count, since by definition
only those that become public can contribute to the Europeanisation of public
spheres. In each of the seven countries, two quality newspapers, one more
left-oriented and one more right-oriented, have been chosen as our main
sources.5 For the year 2000, we additionally include a regional newspaper from
a region with a specific identity,6 and a tabloid newspaper catering to a non-
elite public.7 Where no genuine tabloid was present, we chose a newspaper that
is close in style to a tabloid,8 or another fourth newspaper, the choice of which
depended on the particular composition of the national media landscape.9 We
coded the years 1990, 1995 and 2000–2002. Given the labour-intensive nature
of this type of content coding, we could not code all issues of all newspapers for
all years. For 2000–2002 we coded one issue per week of each of the two quality
190 ruud koopmans
© 2007 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
papers, and for 1990 and 1995 one issue per two weeks. The third and fourth
newspapers for the year 2000 were also coded on the basis of a one-issue-per-
two-weeks sample. Even with these restrictions, our dataset is based on a
formidable amount of information: we scanned more than 2,500 issues of 28
different European newspapers and coded more than 20,000 individual claims.
The codebook, as well as the results of an extensive and successful reliability
test, are available on our project website at: http://europub.wz-berlin.de.
The nature of nationally confined public debates
To judge if certain types of actors are underrepresented or overrepresented in
Europeanised claims-making, we first need to establish a standard of compari-
son. This standard consists of claims that are not Europeanised in any of the
above-defined three senses – that is, claims that are made by actors from the
same country as the newspaper that reports them and that make no reference
whatsoever to other European countries or to European-level actors, issues,
legal frameworks or norms. In order to keep the reference category as pure as
possible, we moreover exclude claims that refer to supranational or intergov-
ernmental levels beyond Europe (e.g., the United Nations).
Table 1 shows the shares of different actors in such ideal-typical ‘nationa-
lised’ claims-making in six issue fields (this table excludes the issue of Euro-
pean integration because it has, by definition, a European dimension).10 We
distinguish three main categories of actors: state and party actors, media actors
and (non-media) civil society actors. Within the category of state and party
actors, we make the common distinction between government/executive, judi-
ciary and legislative actors. Central banks are listed as a separate category
because of their importance in monetary politics. Legislative actors and politi-
cal party representatives have been taken together because in our sources it
was difficult to distinguish them. The same persons could alternatively be
identified as parliamentarians or party spokespersons and it was difficult to
decide which to code. Although we classify them together with government
actors in the broader ‘state and party actor category’, we acknowledge that
political parties occupy an intermediary position between state and civil
society. Legislative actors likewise differ from other state actors because they
are directly elected by and responsible to the public. Therefore, legislative and
party actors merit special treatment in the discussion of our results. The cat-
egory of media actors consists of explicit claims made by journalists of the
coded newspaper, as well as quotations of comments and editorials from other
newspapers. The categories of civil society actors are self-explanatory. The
‘other’ category consists mainly of social movement organisations specialising
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on issues such as women’s emancipation, retirement, peace, human rights,
health and the environment, whose shares were too small to list separately.
The picture of national public debates that emerges from Table 1 is one of
a strong dominance of institutional and resourceful actors. In all issue fields,
government and executive actors (including central banks) are the most
important voices in public debates. In monetary politics, agriculture, immigra-
tion and troop deployment, they are responsible for between 40 and 45
per cent of all claims. In pensions and retirement (30 per cent) and education
(32 per cent) their predominance is less outspoken. The judiciary only plays a
noteworthy role in the field of immigration, where it contributes to discussions
on residence and asylum rights.The contribution of legislative and party actors
is in all fields inferior to that of government and executive actors, but the
extent of the difference varies importantly. In monetary politics and agricul-
ture, the executive’s share of claims is more than five times as high as that of
legislative and party actors. In the other issue fields, legislative and party actors
are more important claim makers, with shares between 16 (education) and 29
per cent (pensions and retirement). In five out of the six fields, state and party
actors taken together are responsible for 50 per cent or more of all claims, with
a maximum of 77 per cent (immigration). Only in monetary politics does their
share fall slightly below half of all claims (48 per cent). However, this does not
make monetary politics an exception to the general rule that resourceful actors
dominate the public debate since the majority of civil society claims in this field
are made by employers and firms (16 per cent) and economic and financial
experts (17 per cent). The influence of these actors contrasts sharply with that
of other groups that arguably have a stake in monetary politics: labour unions
(2 per cent) and consumer groups (no claims at all) are virtually absent from
public debates on monetary politics.
In other issue fields, too, less well-organised and less powerful groups have
only a very limited voice in the public debate. Consumer groups (2 per cent)
and environmental groups (1.5 per cent; included in the table among ‘other
civil society groups’) are quite insignificant in debates on agriculture, even
though the period of our data includes controversies over consumer safety and
environment-related issues such as BSE and foot and mouth disease. Likewise,
immigrants (4 per cent) are marginal in public controversies over their rights,
the peace movement is marginal in debates on troop deployment (1 per cent;
included in ‘other civil society’), and pensioners and elderly people (2.5 per
cent; included in ‘other civil society’) hardly have a voice in debates over
pensions and retirement. There are only a few examples of civil society groups
that do command considerable public attention: farmers in the field of agri-
culture (22 per cent), labour unions in debates on pensions and retirement (14
per cent), and teachers, schools, parents and students in the field of education
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(29 per cent). The media, finally, are especially relevant as speakers on mon-
etary (13 per cent) and troop deployment (22 per cent) issues.
Who participates in Europeanised public debates?
The above results suggest that nationally confined public debates are strongly
biased towards actors who command strong institutional power. The question
is to what extent Europeanisation of public debates alleviates or exacerbates
these power differentials. We begin this investigation by looking in Table 2 at
the strongest form of Europeanisation – namely the participation of suprana-
tional and intergovernmental actors from the European level in public
debates. To analyse this type of supranationally Europeanised claims-making,
we distinguish the same actors as in Table 1. ‘Government/executive’ now
refers to European institutions such as the European Commission, the various
EU Councils of Ministers or the Council of Europe. Likewise, the other cat-
egories refer to the European-level equivalent of national organisations and
institutions (e.g., the European Central Bank, the European Parliament, and
European-level parties, interest groups and NGO’s). Besides formal organisa-
tions on the European level, we also coded a claim as having a European-level
actor if it was supported by a coalition of actors from a range of European
countries (e.g., a demonstration of farmers from various countries in Brussels).
Table 2 leaves no doubt about which actors from the European level are
most effective in making their mark on public debates. In all six substantive
issue fields, the share of executive actors is two to three times as large as it is
in Table 1 for the reference category of national actors making purely national
claims. In spite of what is sometimes said about its deficient communication
strategies (e.g., Meyer 1999), the European Commission is by far the most
often cited European-level organisation and is responsible for more than half
of all executive claims, followed at a distance by the various European Coun-
cils. Commission President Romano Prodi alone is cited 333 times in our
sample, more than any national politician and 2.5 times as often as all
European-level civil society actors taken together (131 claims). As on the
national level, the European executive dominates over the legislative.
However, the relationship is much more skewed than on the national level.The
European Parliament’s role is largest in discussions on European integration,
but even there its share (24 per cent) is only a third of that of the various
branches of the European executive (71 per cent). That European-level media
do not play a significant role is not surprising, but that European-level civil
society actors command a share of only 3 per cent of all claims stemming from
European-level actors is suggestive evidence of a severe democratic deficit. It
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is difficult to see how the absence of any form of public visibility could not
negatively affect the bargaining power of civil society groups within the
European decision-making process.
However, we should not jump to conclusions on the basis of this one form
of Europeanisation of public debates alone. What about horizontal Europe-
anisation of public debates, the coverage of claims by actors from other
European countries? Table 3 shows us which actors benefit from such transna-
tional flows of political communication. We find many tendencies that also
characterise claims-making by European-level actors, only less outspoken.
Government and executive actors play an important role in horizontally Euro-
peanised claims-making, ranging from 43 per cent in education politics to 78
per cent in debates on troop deployment. Legislative and party actors fare
much worse (between 4 per cent in agriculture and 15 per cent in European
integration) and command in every issue field a smaller share than among the
claims with a national frame of reference in Table 1. Most civil society actors
are likewise underrepresented among horizontally Europeanised claims when
compared to the claims with a purely national frame of reference.
For the media the story is different. In most issue fields, claims made by
foreign European news media are represented to a similar extent as are
national media in Table 1. Often this takes the form of overviews of voices
from foreign media, either on important national controversies that have
aroused attention abroad, or on common European issues. The main conclu-
sion remains however that the actors that manage to cross the boundaries of
national public spheres are overwhelmingly core executive actors such as
heads of government and cabinet ministers. Like supranational Europeanisa-
tion, the transnational flow of public communication offers additional oppor-
tunities for those actors that are already dominant on the national level and
exacerbates rather than compensates for the weak position of civil society
actors.
We now turn to the final, vertical variant of Europeanisation, in which
national actors address European institutions or frame issues with reference to
European identities, interests, norms and legal frameworks. National actors
operating in their own national public arena face the strategic choice whether
or not to refer in their claims to European dimensions or to remain fully within
a national frame of reference. As any other form of resource deployment,
discursive framing is a matter of choice under conditions of limited resources
and opportunities. Actors frame issues in a certain way because they hope (or
have learned from past experience) that such framing increases their chances
of having an impact on public debates and policy decisions.
The results in Table 4 show, in line with our earlier results, that government
and executive actors are more likely to use Europeanised frames than
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legislative and party actors. Except in the education field, the share of govern-
ment and executive actors is larger among the claims with a Europeanised
frame in Table 4 than it is among the purely national claims in Table 1. Legis-
lative and party actors command similar shares in both tables in most issue
fields, but in immigration politics and pensions and retirement they are clearly
underrepresented among Europeanised claims. The share of civil society
actors is again lower than among purely national claims. The only exception is
pensions and retirement politics, but a closer inspection of the kind of civil
society actors that account for this result confirms the general trend that
Europeanised claims-making correlates with institutional power. Compared to
Table 1, the civil society actors that expand their share in pensions and retire-
ment claims with a Europeanised frame are employers (14 per cent in Table 4
against 8 per cent in Table 1) and financial experts (12 per cent in Table 4 and
3 per cent in Table 1). By contrast, the share of labour unions declines (from 14
per cent in Table 1 to 10 per cent in Table 4) and pensioners’ organisations are
completely absent among the Europeanised claims. The low number of cases
for this issue field in Table 4 implies that we should not attach too much weight
to these figures, but they do fall into the by now familiar pattern.
Combining the three types of Europeanisation, the results are clear-cut.
The only actors that are systematically overrepresented in supranationally,
horizontally, as well as vertically Europeanised claims-making are government
and executive actors.Across all issue fields, they are responsible for 33 per cent
of all purely national claims (see the total column in Table 1), but across the
three forms of Europeanised claims-making their share rises to 54 per cent
(average computed across Tables 2 to 4). Media actors are, somewhat surpris-
ingly perhaps, the only other actor type that is more prominently represented
in Europeanised claims-making (6 per cent of purely national claims against a
share of 10 per cent of Europeanised claims). Europeanisation of claims-
making does not strengthen the hand of legislative and party actors, whose
share is 20 per cent in purely national claims-making and 15 per cent across all
forms of Europeanised claims-making. That may not seem a large difference,
but to appreciate its importance one must look at the relative influence of
legislative versus executive actors. Among purely national claims, the execu-
tive outnumbers legislative and party actors two to one, but among Europea-
nised claims the proportion is almost four to one. Civil society actors, finally,
are clearly the least able to profit from the opening up of Europeanised
discursive spaces. Among purely national claims, they command a reasonable
share of 35 per cent of all claims (Table 1), but among Europeanised claims,
they are responsible for only 13 per cent of claims (Tables 2 to 4 combined).11
Specific civil society actors are better considered in the context of the
specific issue fields in which they are most active. In almost all cases, such an
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issue-specific perspective reveals a considerable decline in discursive influence
for these actors among Europeanised claims. For instance, farmers make 22
per cent of the purely national claims on agriculture (Table 1), but only 11 per
cent of Europeanised claims (Tables 2 to 4 combined). In monetary politics,
employers command 16 per cent of national claims, but only 5 per cent of
Europeanised claims. Labour unions likewise have less influence in Europea-
nised debates in the issue fields where they are strong (14 against 8 per cent in
pensions and retirement and 9 against 5 per cent in education). Pensioners’
groups, already very weak among national claims in pensions and retirement
politics (2.5 per cent) are even weaker (0.6 per cent; included in ‘other civil
society’) among Europeanised claims.The same holds for consumer groups on
agricultural issues (2 versus 0.8 per cent), and to a lesser extent for immigrants
in their field (4 against 3 per cent).The only example of a civil society actor that
does better among Europeanised claims concerns employers’ organisations in
the pensions and retirement field, whose share among Europeanised claims
(9 per cent) is slightly higher than among purely national claims (8 per cent).
Who supports and who opposes European institutions and European
integration?
Having established which actors populate the Europeanised public sphere, we
now ask what positions these actors take with regard to European institutions
and European integration. Our guiding hypothesis is that collective actors’
subjective attitude towards Europe reflects the degree to which they profit
from the Europeanisation of public debates. We expect, therefore, that gov-
ernment and executive actors will be more favourable towards European
integration and European institutions than legislative and party actors, and we
expect both to be more supportive of European integration than civil society
actors.The media, finally, are expected to fall somewhere in between, but more
on the supportive side.
To validate these expectations, we limit our analysis to claims that have a
European dimension (i.e., we exclude the purely national claims reported in
Table 1, as well as those from Table 3 that only refer to the national policies of
foreign European countries) and look at how actors evaluate European insti-
tutions and the European integration process. We begin by looking at claims
that directly address European actors and institutions, either by appealing to
them to fulfil certain demands, or by expressing criticism or support. We
computed an average score for each category of actors indicating how posi-
tively or negatively they viewed the European institutions and actors they
addressed. The score is computed by assigning a +1 score each time that
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European addressees are the target of support, -1 if they are the target of
criticism and 0 if they are targeted in a neutral or ambivalent way.These scores
are then averaged across claims. The resulting average score on a range
between +1 and -1 indicates to what extent European institutions are evalu-
ated positively or negatively by a particular category of actors. To allow us to
place the evaluations given to European institutions into perspective, Table 5
also gives the average scores for the evaluation of national addressees. Thus,
the table shows if a particular category of actors views European institutions
more or less positively than national institutions.
At first sight the results seem to confirm the prejudice that public discourse
with regard to European institutions is overwhelmingly negative. Indeed, the
average evaluation of European institutions across all actors is negative
(-0.12). However, political discourse generally tends to be negatively oriented
for the simple reason that in a competitive environment political actors have
less incentive to publicly support than to criticise other actors. Moreover, the
public is more interested in conflict and criticism than in issues on which
everybody agrees. The real touchstone for judging whether public discourse
with regard to European institutions is overly ‘Eurosceptic’ is therefore how
European institutions fare compared to their counterparts on the national
level. Seen from this angle, the picture looks much less bleak because national
institutions tend to be evaluated more negatively (-0.21) than European ones.
However, these averages hide important differences between actors. As we
expected, state and party actors (-0.06) evaluate European institutions much
more positively (or better: less negatively) than civil society actors (-0.30).
However, within both categories, there is large variation. As expected, govern-
ment and executive actors (-0.02) as well as central banks (+0.04) and the
judiciary (+0.14) are relatively positive about European institutions, whereas
legislative and party actors are much more critical (-0.25).There is also impor-
tant variation among civil society actors. Consumers groups, farmers, the
residual category of other civil society organisations, financial experts, students
and educational professionals, labour unions and employers all conform to our
expectations and display below average levels of support for European insti-
tutions. That employer organisations and business firms are the least negative
also fits our hypotheses because they were better represented in Europeanised
public debates than most other civil society actors.Two other categories of civil
society actors deviate from this pattern. Science, research and other profes-
sionals are slightly less negative about European institutions (-0.09) than the
overall average, and immigrants even top the list with a positive score of +0.20,
which is, however, based on few cases. We can speculate that what these actors
have in common and may explain their supportive stance is that they both have
a transnational habitus and profit above average from the internal freedom of
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movement within the EU in the form of cross-national scientific exchange and
research funding and simplified travel and visa regulations for immigrants.
The media are a further deviation from our expectations. Because news
media are overrepresented among Europeanised claims, we expected them to
be favourably inclined towards European institutions. However, media actors
turn out to take a negative position, close to the average for non-media civil
society actors.To make sense of this result, we must realise that the media have
a special position in the public discourse. All other actors must struggle to get
media attention. The media, however, can decide for themselves whether or
not to speak out publicly without having to pass any selection hurdles. Thus
underrepresentation or overrepresentation of the media in Europeanised
public debates is not a function of the impacts of European integration on the
discursive opportunities for the media, but is entirely a matter of editorial
choice. Clearly, the ambiguous result for the media deserves closer inspection,
but that would be a study of its own, which would also have to look at
differences among individual newspapers (see Koopmans & Pfetsch (2003) for
such an analysis for the German case).
In Table 6, we investigate whether these patterns hold if we look at general
support for or opposition to the European integration process. We coded
actors’ general evaluations of the European integration process in a similar
way as the evaluations of European addressees. A score of +1 was given if a
claimant expressed support for the European integration process or if the
claim implied extensions (or a rejection of restrictions) in the rights and
prerogatives of European institutions.A score of -1 indicates opposition to the
integration process or implications of the claim that restrict (or oppose exten-
sion of) the rights and prerogatives of European institutions. A score of 0,
finally, indicates positions that are neutral or ambivalent towards the integra-
tion process.
The first important thing to note is that evaluations of the integration
process are much more positive than evaluations of concrete European actors
and institutions. Whereas almost all actors were on average critical of Euro-
pean institutions, with the single (and only slight) exception of farmers, no
category of actors is on average opposed to European integration. Regarding
differences among actors, the results confirm the earlier findings. State and
party actors are more supportive of European integration than civil society
actors, and within the former category, Euro-enthusiasm is clearly more
limited among legislative and party actors than among government and execu-
tive actors. Most civil society actors display below average levels of support for
European integration, and again employers and business organisations are
comparatively positive about European integration. The difference with the
position of labour unions is, however, much smaller than in Table 5, suggesting
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the plausible interpretation that both groups are more or less equally support-
ive of European integration, but that employers are less dissatisfied with how
European integration has been concretely implemented by European institu-
tions than are labour unions. In contrast to Table 5, immigrants no longer
deviate from other civil society actors, but science, research and other profes-
sionals again display a high level of support for European integration. The
news media are again close to the average for non-media civil society actors.
We may conclude, then, that the hypothesis that the degree to which actors
profit or stand to lose from the Europeanisation of public debates is mirrored
in their support for European integration receives considerable, but not com-
plete, support.12 We are aware that there is a caveat here. Could it be that it is
not discursive influence that determines actors’ attitude towards Europe, but
that the causal direction is the other way around – namely that the critical
attitude of some actors towards the EU is the reason why they do not mobilise






Science, research, and other
professionals
+0.30
All state and party actors +0.27
Judiciary +0.20
Employers and firms +0.18
Central banks +0.16
Unions and employees +0.15
All non-media civil society actors +0.14
Immigrants +0.14
Media +0.13
Legislative and parties +0.13
Economists and financial experts +0.12
Students and educational professionals +0.09
Consumers +0.08
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on the European level and do not frame issues in a European context? This
alternative reading of our results does not strike us as convincing because
there is no reason why actors who are opposed to European policies and
institutions would refrain from mobilising on the European level, from
addressing European policies and institutions, or from asking their national
governments to do something about them. When we speak of Europeanised
public debates, we do not mean a unisono chorus of Europhiles, but a con-
tested discourse in which – just as in national public debates – opponents have
as much reason to make their voices heard as supporters. Moreover, the
myriad of civil society groups and NGOs that have organised and committed
their scarce resources to setting up European representations and federations
speak against a lack of attempts to gain a foothold on the European level. The
simple fact is that among the voices that come to us from Brussels, these many
organisations are hardly ever heard.
Conclusions and discussion
Earlier work has shown that the main problem regarding the Europeanisation
of political communication is not of a quantitative nature. In those policy fields
where Europe matters, European actors and actors from other Member States
are frequently covered in national media, and national actors, including the
media themselves, often refer to European dimensions of issues. However, this
leaves open the possibility of a qualitative deficit of Europeanised political
debates. The mass media public sphere on which European political commu-
nication relies even more than national political communication is a highly
competitive environment in which actors compete for limited public visibility,
resonance and legitimacy (Koopmans 2004b). European integration shifts the
distribution of discursive opportunities and resources to influence public
debates, improving the relative influence of some actors and weakening that of
others.
Our results clearly demonstrate that thus far European integration has
remained a project by political elites and, at least in as far as discursive
influence is concerned, also to the benefit of political elites. Core state actors
such as heads of state and government, cabinet ministers and central banks are
by far the most important beneficiaries of the Europeanisation of public
debates, in whichever form it occurs. Legislative and party actors – those actors
from the core of the political system who are directly accountable to the
electorate – are much less well represented in Europeanised public debates,
both in an absolute sense and even more so relative to government and
executive actors. Such an erosion of the contribution of parliaments and
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political parties to public debates on Europeanised issues seems problematic
from the normative point of view of democratic legitimacy and accountability.
The same is true for the extremely weak representation of civil society actors
in Europeanised public debates. Less resourceful civil society interests such as
consumers’ organisations, environmental groups or pensioners are even more
strongly underrepresented in Europeanised public debates than more power-
ful groups such as labour unions and business interests.
The differences among the three forms of Europeanisation are also prob-
lematic from the point of view of the democratic quality of public debates.The
strongest form of Europeanisation – namely the participation of European-
level actors in public debates – is also by far the most exclusive. Civil society
actors are almost completely absent from the voices that reach the national
level coming down from the European level. Transnational flows of political
communication across Member State boundaries are less exclusive, but still
this horizontal form of Europeanised political communication is mainly a
playground for statesmen and a few other powerful interests. The only form of
Europeanised political communication in which the role of civil society actors
approaches that in purely national debates is the vertical variant, in which
national actors make claims within a European frame of reference either
directly addressed at European institutions or more often addressed at
national authorities, but referring to European identities, norms and legal
frameworks. Yet even there the position of most civil society actors is weaker
than in public debates of the ‘traditional’ type, which remain confined to a
purely national frame of reference.
We have shown that these shifts in discursive influence are closely related
to patterns of support for and opposition to European institutions and the
European integration process.As a general rule, actors who are less influential
in Europeanised public debates tend also to be more critical of European
institutions and less supportive of the integration process than actors whose
voices are more prominent in Europeanised public debates. The only consis-
tent exception to this rule are science, research and other professionals, who
are more than average supportive of European integration even though they
are underrepresented in Europeanised public debates. Clearly, European inte-
gration’s impact on actors’ discursive influence is not the only factor that
determines the position of collective actors on European integration. It is far
from us to advocate a simplistic, monocausal explanation of support for Euro-
pean institutions and the integration process. Nonetheless, we are struck by the
high degree of correspondence between objective discursive influence and
subjective attitudes for most of the actors that we have investigated.
To be perfectly clear about what we mean to say: we do not maintain that
the distribution of power in public debates is a free-floating phenomenon that
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bears no relation to what some might maintain is the ‘hard’ power of policy
influence. As we have tried to make clear throughout, we expect a high degree
of correspondence between discursive and policy-making power and influence.
Such correspondence can come about in at least two ways. First, power and
prominence are important news values that structure the way in which media
select a few ‘newsworthy’ claims for coverage and discard many others. Media
professionals’ knowledge of who is important and influential in European
policy circles will therefore structure their news selection, with the result of a
convergence between discursive and policy-making power. Second and con-
versely, influence in the public debate may translate into policy-making power.
Successful mobilisation of media attention directly influences policy makers
and has the potential of influencing the attitudes of the public at large, which
in turn may affect policy makers’ positions and the relative standing and power
of actors in the policy process.
Whichever mix of these mechanisms operates, it should be clear that actors’
influence in public debates is only semi-autonomous from actors’ influence in
the policy process. However, it is also so the other way around.We suggest that
the strong association between policy influence and influence in public debates
opens up new possibilities for employing methodologies similar to the one we
have used as a complement to traditional policy analyses. Especially if one is
interested in questions involving several issues and countries across a longer
period of time, measuring actors’ influence and position in public debates can
be a reasonably accurate proxy for policy influence and policy positions, which
are often hard to measure in more direct ways.
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Notes
1. Tarrow (1994: 85) defines political opportunity structures as ‘consistent – but not nec-
essarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide
incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for
success and failure’.
2. The only exceptions are editorials from the coded newspaper. These will be analysed
separately. All other claims by journalists from the coded newspaper were, however,
included, as were any claims by other news media (including quotations from editorials)
that were reported in the coded newspaper.
3. We have also gathered data on claims that were made by actors from countries outside
Europe or by representatives of supranational institutions with a wider scope than
Europe (e.g., the United Nations or NATO). However, we exclude those data from the
present analysis because we are here interested in contrasting Europeanised and
national claims-making.
4. Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union (except, of course, the three
Baltic EU Member States) were excluded. It is admittedly to some extent contestable
where exactly to draw the line between Europe and non-Europe. However, alternative
operationalisations hardly affect our results because the vast majority of claims are from
actors in the EU Member States and from the EU-level proper.
5. Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Germany); El Pais and Abc
(Spain); Le Monde and Le Figaro (France); La Repubblica and Il Corriere della Sera
(Italy); De Volkskrant and Algemeen Dagblad (The Netherlands); The Guardian and The
Times (United Kingdom); and Le Temps (appearing from 1998 onwards), the Journal de
Genève (which was taken instead of Le Temps for the years 1990 and 1995) and Neue
Zürcher Zeitung (Switzerland).
6. Leipziger Volkszeitung (former East Germany); La Vanguardia (Catalunya, Spain);
Ouest France (Western France); Il Mattino and La Nazione (Italy, respectively from
Campania in the South and Tuscany in the Centre of the country); Leeuwarder Courant
(Friesland, The Netherlands); The Scotsman (Scotland, United Kingdom); and Le Matin
(French-speaking region, Switzerland).
7. Bild-Zeitung (Germany); The Sun (United Kingdom); and Blick (Switzerland).
8. De Telegraaf in the Netherlands.
9. El Mundo (Spain) and L’Humanité (France). In Italy, we chose a second regional
newspaper as our fourth paper (see Note 6).
10. In the countries that are part of the Eurozone, there can likewise be no monetary politics
claims that are purely national for the period since the introduction of the Euro. The
monetary politics claims in Table 1 therefore refer either to the years 1990 and 1995, or
to Switzerland and the United Kingdom for 2000–2002.
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11. We checked whether our conclusions hold across countries, and also conducted all
analyses for each country separately. Our main conclusions are highly consistent across
countries. In each country-specific analysis, government and executive actors as well as
the news media were overrepresented among Europeanised claims, and in each case civil
society actors were strongly underrepresented.
12. Again, we found that the results were highly consistent across the seven countries.
Government and executive actors are without exception more than averagely favour-
able towards European institutions and the European integration process. Everywhere,
legislative and party actors are more skeptical; and in all seven countries, civil society
actors show the lowest levels of support.
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